Abstract. This paper describes a refinement-based approach to show that a native Java Card API function fulfills its specification. We refine a native function from its informal specification (by Sun) through several intermediate models into a low-level model which is very close to its C implementations. We formally prove the correctness of the refinement steps between two adjacent levels. The low-level model is sufficiently detailed such that its correspondence to the C implementation can be informally checked. This work provides a framework to enforce the security of the native code by formal analysis and can be generalized to verify a complete implementation of the Java Card platform.
Introduction
Native API methods are usually written in C and are considered as part of the Java Card platform. On the contrary, non-native methods are written in Java Card and can be seen as applications running on the Java Card platform. Formal analysis of Java Card API methods has been done in several previous works (i.e., [1] [2] [3] ) using languages and tools dedicated to Java such as JML [4] (and its associated tools) and JACK [5] . On the contrary, in our knowledge, native methods have never been addressed. The main obstacle is related to their C implementation which is yet to be well handled by formal analysis.
Refinement is one of the cornerstones of formal approaches for software engineering: the process of developing a more detailed design or implementation from an abstract specification through a sequence of mathematically-based steps that maintain correctness w.r.t. the original specification. In the formal tools like BMethod or Esterel, the informal specification can be modelled, refined and then automatically translated into C code. However, in both of these systems, the generated code is not sufficiently efficient (in terms of performance and resource consuming) to fit into smart cards. Some attempts (e.g., [6] ) have been done to optimize the generated code but these optimizations are usually complex and may jeopardize the rigour provided by formal tools. Furthermore, in the industry, we often need to directly deal with an already developed product rather than starting from its informal specification.
In this work, we aim at certifying an existing implementation of the native methods that are already embedded on smart cards. To this end, we build a low-level model of the JCVM (Java Card Virtual Machine) which is sufficiently close to its C implementation such that the correspondence between them can be informally checked. We also build two intermediate models in order to refine the informal specification of the native methods to the low-level model. Both of the models are built using the Coq proof assistant [7] which allows us to formally prove the correctness of each refinement step.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes several refining models of the native API methods. In Section 3, we provide their low-level model basing on a concrete JCVM implementation. Section 4 presents the correctness of refinement steps and its proof. Section 5 shows the relation between the low-level model and the concrete implementation. We discuss the related work in Section 6 and give some concluding remarks in Section 7.
Refining Informal Specification
The model of a native method must be built upon a model of the whole JCVM. In this paper, the JCVM is always modelled as a state machine. A state is a snapshot of all components of the JCVM: installed CAP files, heap, frame stack, static fields image, JCRE elements, etc. A primitive operation is a basic access service to one of these component (e.g., popping and pushing a frame onto the frame stack, getting and setting an object in the heap). A primitive operation takes a state and its parameters and yields a new state and (possibly) a value. Any JCVM function (e.g., a bytecode or a native function) can be seen as a sequence of primitive operations. The execution of a JCVM function transforms an (initial) state into a (final) state and (possibly) returns a value. If an exception is raised during this execution, then the returned value is the address of this exception which allows the JCVM to lookup for the exception handler. The informal specification of a native method is refined by the following intermediate models (see a resume in Figure 1 ):
Model
FSP is the Functional SPecification of the native function and is built upon the FIVM (Formal Internal Virtual Machine) state machine. In this model, a native function is specified by its expected input and output which are respectively defined by a pre-condition and a post-condition following Hoare logic [8] . These input and output are described in the informal specification and hence, the FSP model is completely independent of any concrete implementation. HLD is the High-Level Description of the native function which is also built upon the FIVM state machine. However, in this model, the native function is specified by its algorithm i.e., a function taking its input and returning its output. This function is written by a sequence of primitive operations. Because the data structures and the primitive operations are kept abstract in FIVM, the HLD model is also independent of any concrete implementation. LLD is the Low-Level Description of the native function built upon the CVM (Concrete Virtual Machine) state machine. Like the HLD model, the LLD model of a native function specifies its algorithm as a sequence of primitive operations. However, all CVM data structures and primitive operations are fully defined basing on a concrete JCVM implementation (by Axalto). Therefore, the LLD model is also strongly related to this concrete implementation.
Functional Specification Model
FIVM states. In FIVM, the card memory is seen as a set of memory cells. Each cell is associated to an address which will be used to access to this cell. This structure contains the security context of the applet that owns the object, a flag indicating its memory mode (persistent, CLEAR ON RESET or CLEAR ON DESELECT transient), a boolean flag indicating its remote mode, and the address of its class info structure (which defines its class) in the installed packages. Similarly, an array is represented by its header structure which contains the type of its elements, its length, its security context and its memory mode. 3. Frame stack stores the stack of frames and is the core data structure needed for method interpretation [9] . In FIVM, the execution of a method is done inside a frame which is defined as follows:
Record fivm frame info : Set := { ifrm pc : address; ifrm context : frame context; ifrm max locals : nat; ifrm max stack : nat }. where ifrm pc is the program counter and points to the next bytecode to be executed; ifrm context is the currently active context in which the method is being executed; ifrm max locals is the number of local variables of the method including its parameters; ifrm max stack is the number of FIVM words allocated to the operand stack where the intermediate results are pushed in and popped out during the execution of the method. 4. Static fields image stores the static fields of the installed packages. 5. JCRE stores the information used by the JCRE (Java Card Runtime Environment).
Primitive operations. The FSP primitive operations are defined as Coq predicates i.e., relations between the input and the output of the operations in order to ease the modelling of the pre-and post-conditions. The FSP primitive operations are abstract i.e., only their signature is given as Coq parameters. We briefly draw the primitive operations on different FIVM components in the following:
1. Installed packages: FIVM provides primitive operations to check if a given package has been correctly installed on the card, and to access to all components of the installed packages.
Heap: FIVM provides primitive operations to access to all heap elements
i.e., object and array headers, object instance fields and array elements. For example, the access to an object header pointed by an address is done via the predicate heap object header:
Parameter heap object header : fivm state → address → fivm object header → Prop. 3. Frame stack elements: FIVM provides primitive operations to pop the top frame, and to push a new frame onto the frame stack. 4. Static fields: FIVM provides read and write services for static fields. 5. JCRE: FIVM provides primitive operations to access to all JCRE information. For example, the currently active applet is accessed by fivm selected applet:
Firewall control. The firewall mechanism (Chapter 6 of [10] ) ensures that the access to a JCVM element (e.g., objects, arrays, static fields) is allowed if and only if the currently active context (i.e., the context of the currently active applet) is the security context of the element. Exceptionally, the JCRE has a global privileged context and can access to all JCVM elements. All firewall conditions can be modelled using the primitive operations described above.
Native methods. The pre-condition defines the constraints on the input which is composed of the initial FIVM state and the list of parameters encoded as FIVM words (iword). The post-condition defines the constraints on the output which is composed of the final FIVM state and a (possibly) returned value encoded as a FIVM word. This optional returned value is encoded in Coq by the type (option iword) which covers two cases: (Some v) means that a value v of type iword is returned and (None iword) means that no value is returned (void return).
Example 1.
This example describes the model of the native method export of the class javacard.framework.service.CardRemoteObject. This method allows an on-card (remote) object to be (remotely) accessed by the card reader.
The method export has only one parameter which is the address of the object to be exported. This constraint is modelled by the following pre-condition:
Definition export pre (ctxt:frame context)(args : list iword ) : Prop := ∃ theObj :address, args = (address2iword theObj )::nil. where address2iword transforms the parameter theObj (which is an address) into a FIVM word. The output of export depends on its parameter, on the initial FIVM state (fin) and on the firewall condition 1 :
-if the parameter points to an allocated object in the heap 2 and the firewall condition is satisfied, then the remote mode of the object is set to true and export returns void. By changing the remote mode of the object, a new machine state (fout) is created from fin.
-else, export throws a security exception and the FIVM state is not modified. 
where the predicate (obj jcre or same owner . . . ) checks if the security context of the currently active applet (selapp) is either the (global) JCRE context or the security context of the object (to be exported) whose the header structure is hdr.
High-Level Model
The HLD model is also built upon the FIVM state machine. The JCVM functions are specified in the HLD model by their algorithm i.e., by a function taking their input and returning their output. In this context, the HLD primitive operations must also be specified by Coq (abstract) functions instead of Coq predicates as in the FSP model. For functions that modify the content of the memory, their return also includes a new FIVM state. On the other hand, the HLD functions must be defined as total computable functions in Coq to ensure the termination of its computations.
In order to transform partial FSP functions into HLD total functions, a new constant (FivmaFatalError) is introduced to lift their co-domain. That is, a partial function is set to return FivmaFatalError when its output is not defined:
Inductive fivma fatal error : Set := FivmaFatalError : fivma fatal error.
Notice that FivmaFatalError represents a model-level error and is not related to any Java Card runtime error or exception. All HLD functions will now return a value of type (fivma val A) where A is its return type in the normal case. For example, the function fivma set remote object header updates the (boolean) remote mode flag of an object pointed by an address is specified as follows: Parameter fivma set remote object header : fivm state → address → bool → (fivma val fivm state).
This function returns a new FIVM state (because the memory content has been modified) and is abstract (like all other HLD primitive operations), that is, its specification consists only of its signature.
Error handling. The error case makes the usage of functions more complex because there is now one more case to consider in each function call. For smoothly handling this case, a new construct is defined:
Definition try with (C : Set) (e : exc V1 E1 ) (f : V1 → C ) (g : E1 → C ):
C := match e with | Value x ⇒ f x | Error y ⇒ g y end. Actually, try with allows one to handle both cases of a total function. In the error case, the error (y) is handled by the function g. In the normal case, the returned value of the function (x) is used in the rest of the model (f). A new syntactic sugar try1 is also defined such that (try1 w=(F e) in H with err => G) compiles to (G err) if (F e) returns the error err, and to (H val) if it returns the value val. In particular, if err and G are omitted, then any error will be handled by a default procedure which consists in transferring the error to the higher level (e.g., the invoking function).
Native methods. The algorithm of a native method is defined as a sequence of the HLD primitive operations. The input of a native method is composed of the initial FIVM state and the list of parameters encoded as FIVM words. A native method may return a value or throws an exception by returning its address. In any case, the output of the method is composed of the final FIVM state and the (possibly) returned value encoded by the type (option iword).
Example 2. The algorithm of export (see Example 1) is described as follows:
1. if the list of arguments is empty, then a fatal error is raised, else, 2. convert the first argument into an object address using iword2address; 3. extract the object header pointed by this address using fivma get object header; 4. check if the currently active context is either the global JCRE context (using fivma test jcre context), or the security context of the object (using fivma test obj same owner) (the firewall condition); 5. if the firewall condition is satisfied, then return void and the final state (which has been updated by fivma set remote object header), else return the address of the security exception and the initial state. 
Low-Level Model of a JCVM implementation
The LLD model specifies a real JCVM implementation on a new state machine called CVM (Concrete Virtual Machine). All the components of this state machine are defined as concrete data structures. Therefore, all CVM primitive operations can now be defined as concrete algorithms. The algorithm of a native method are then refined to be close to its C implementation. In this section, for space reason, we only concentrate on the frame stack as well as on the invoking and the returning process of a (Java Card or native) method.
Frame stack
A CVM frame is composed of the following elements:
-an operand stack is a stack of 16-bits words (cvm word).
-a table of local variables, each of them being a 16-bits word.
-a security information representing the currently active context. -a program counter pointing to the next bytecode to be executed.
As in FIVM state machine, the frame stack is part of the CVM state and is defined as follows: -The contiguous memory segment cvm_frame_stack stores successively the frame stack itself. For each frame, firstly appears the local variable table, then its header, and finally its operand stack (see Figure 2 ). -jsp is a pointer to the top of the operand stack of the current frame (i.e., the top frame). -locals points to the beginning of the local variable table of the current frame. -ctxt points to the header of the current frame. This header is composed of:
• localsOffset: a byte representing the offset from the header of the current frame (current ctxt) to the first item of the local variable table of the previous frame. This information is needed to recover the previous frame upon return from the current method i.e., to recover the old value of locals.
• contextInfo: a byte containing the currently active context.
• nextpc: a program counter pointing to the location where the virtual machine resumes upon return from the current method.
• prev: a pointer to the header of the previous frame (old ctxt).
Java Card methods
Invocation. When a Java Card method is invoked, a new frame is pushed onto the frame stack. The local variable table (locals) of the new frame is set to the first parameter of the invoked method which have been pushed onto the operand stack of the previous frame by the invoking method (see Figure 2) . This is an optimization in the JCVM implementation to avoid copying these parameters and to reduce memory consumption. The header of the invoked method is stored after the new local variable table whose the length is determined by its method info structure stored in its CAP file. Then the global variables are updates according to the new current frame:
-jsp points to the operand stack of the new frame i.e., just after its header.
-locals points to the first item of the new local variable table.
-ctxt points to the header of the new frame.
Return. The returning process consists in popping the top frame by restoring the values of the global variables as follows:
1. jsp is assigned to the value of locals, that is all parameters must have been popped from the operand stack during executing the invoked method. 2. locals is assigned to the current value of ctxt minus the value of the localsOffset field of the header of the current frame. This indeed points to the local variable table of the previous frame. 3. ctxt is assigned to the value of the prev field of the header of the current frame.
Native methods
When a native method is invoked, its parameters are also pushed into the operand stack (of the current frame) as it is done when invoking a Java Card method. However, the native function is executed in the same frame of the invoking method and no new frame is created on the frame stack. After the execution of the native function, a returned type, which is of type short, is pushed on the top of the operand stack. If this type is 1 or 2, then there is a returned value which has been pushed onto the operand stack just under the returned type.
Otherwise, the method returns void. The CVM retrieves the returned value if there is any, pops out the parameters and moves the program counter to the next bytecode to be executed. In the LLD model, a native method is defined as a total function using the CVM primitive operations. These primitive operations, which are abstract in the HLD model, are fully defined as Coq functions in the LLD model. The input of a native method is composed of the initial CVM state and the list of parameters encoded as CVM words (cvm word). The output of the method is only composed of the final CVM state because the (possibly) returned value and its type are already pushed onto the operand stack of the current frame.
Example 3. The following LLD model of export is very similar to the HLD model presented in Example 2 except for the returning process: in the LLD model, the (possibly) returned value and its type are explicitly pushed onto the operand stack (by cvm frame push). 
Correctness of Refinement
Informally, the refinement from a model to another model is correct if there is a correspondence between the executions of a native method in these two model. 
FSP to HLD refinement
This refinement step is correct if the algorithm defined in the HLD model fulfills its specification defined in the FSP model. In Hoare logic, a function f fulfills its pre-condition P re f and post-condition P ost f if:
where x, y respectively represent the input and the output of f . This statement is translated in Coq for the method export as follows:
Theorem fivma export proof : ∀ (args: list iword )(fin fout: fivm state)(result: option iword ), (fivma export args fin) = (result, fout) → (export pre args fin) → (export post args fin fout result).
It is not difficult to see that this theorem is a special case of Theorem 1 where both R 1 and R 2 are the identity relation because both FSP and HLD models are built upon the state machine FIVM.
HLD to LLD refinement
For any native method, this refinement step is correct if the returning process from the method produce a similar effect in the FIVM and CVM state machines. In the HLD model, because the frame stack is abstract, the (possibly) returned value is pushed onto the operand stack and then, be popped by the invoking method in an opaque way. In the LLD model (see Section 3.3), the frame stack is detailed and all pop and push operations are explicitly performed on the operand stack. We need to chow that the two returning process produce the corresponding final states and returned values, providing that the initial states and the method parameters are respectively related by cvm fivm link state (which abstractly relates CVM states to FIVM states) and cvm word2iword (which abstractly converts CVM words into FIVM words).
Therefore, the correctness of the refinement must be stated for all two execution scenarios of a native method: (1) it returns a value or the address of an exception, and (2) it returns void. For example, the two theorems to be proved for export are described as follows:
C code while in the top-down approach, the informal specification is formalized and refined to an C implementation.
The top-down approach is used in several works [6] using B-Method to automatically generate C code from a formal model. The bottom-up approach is used, for example, in [17] to generate Coq model of C code using tools like Caduceus and Why. The method presented in this paper can be seen as a mixed approach because the low-level model is designed by refining the higher-level models and by abstracting the C code to be certified.
While formal verification of C code is still not straightforward, many researchers have focused on the static analysis of information flow [18] (and/or abstract interpretation) as a feasible means to improve the security of C code. In this direction, the research has given rise to several industrial tools such as CAVEAT [19] or PolySpace.
Concluding Remarks
We described a refinement-based approach to verify the conformance of a Java Card native function w.r.t. their specification. The main idea is to use three intermediate models: the FSP model describes the expected input and output of the function (basing on the informal specification), the HLD model defines the algorithm of the function on an abstract JCVM, and the LLD model refines this algorithm on a concrete JCVM implementation. The refinement steps between two adjacent models are formally proved in Coq. This approach can be applied as well to the bytecode interpretation because a native function is actually a programmer-customized extension to the Java Card instruction set.
The two state machines (FIVM and CVM) used in this work were built during the French-funded FORMAVIE research project to fulfill the Common Criteria requirements [20] on the JCVM development. Using these models, we showed the conformance of the Java Card interpreter and linker developed in Axalto w.r.t. the JCVM specification (by Sun). The verification of the native API methods is an extension of this project and is an ongoing work. Actually, the set of native API methods varies between different implementations (this set is not precisely defined in the API specification) but for many methods, only a native implementation can be satisfactory in terms of performance and/or security (e.g., the update operation on arrays or the PIN operations). We based on the Axalto implementation to built the LLD model. On the contrary, the higher-level FSP and HLD models are abstract and can be used for checking other implementations. Furthermore, both of these models can be used to reason on the high-level security properties of the native functions and of the JCVM platform.
